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ABSTRACT
Graduated income tax rates and transfer programs create piecewise-linear budget constraints that
consist of budget segments and kink points. With any change in these tax rules, each individual may
switch between a kink point and a budget segment, between two budget segments, or between two
kink points. With errors in the estimated labor supply equation, the new choice is uncertain, and so
the welfare effects of a tax change are uncertain. We propose a simulation-based method to compute
expected welfare effects that is easy to implement and that fully accounts for uncertainties about
choices around kink points. Our method also provides information about expected changes in
working hours.
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Graduated income tax rates and income transfer programs create piecewise-linear bud-
get constraints that are composed of a collection of budget segments and kink points. A
considerable body of work estimates labor supply under such budget sets.1 Key insights in
this literature are that the consumer may choose a budget segment or a kink, whichever
provides maximum utility, and that this behavior is estimated with error.
Economists also calculate welfare loss due to taxation of labor supply. Many use labor
supply estimates to calculate average and marginal welfare loss, and many evaluate the
economic eects of proposed and real tax reforms. As reviewed below, however, existing
welfare cost calculations often do not fully account for the errors of estimation and their
interaction with the nonlinear budget constraint for each individual. In particular, with
a change of tax schedule, the stochastic specication means that each individual has a
distribution of possible outcomes: she may switch to another budget segment, switch to
a kink point, or even switch to or from participating in the labor force. In general, each
dierent budget segment produces a dierent net wage and a dierent virtual income.
In this paper, we develop a method to calculate welfare cost that employs the full
stochastic specication of any estimated labor supply model. In particular, we account
for uncertainties that arise from estimating errors by using Monte Carlo simulation across
heterogeneous individuals. For each individual, this method uses the estimated probabilities
of switching from each segment or kink point to another to calculate \expected" welfare
loss for each individual. This method also identies the expected change of working hours.
Moreover, it provides a natural way to aggregate welfare loss and the change in working
hours for various types of heterogeneous individuals. We then illustrate this method using
three existing samples of individuals and estimates of labor supply behavior.
The problem of welfare loss from labor taxes under piecewise-linear budget constraints
is essentially the same problem as calculating consumer surplus or willingness-to-pay in
discrete choice models where choices are mutually exclusive. Similarly, in the labor supply
1For surveys, see Hausman (1985), Mot (1990, 2002), and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999).
1model, a worker may choose only one budget segment or kink point. Small and Rosen
(1981) were among the rst to study systematically the eect of a price change on wel-
fare for discrete choice models. However, their study did not account for the possibility
of changing income. McFadden (1999) thoroughly discusses a willingness-to-pay problem
in discrete choice models by explicitly comparing the choices that yield maximum utilities
before and after changes in some specic attributes of arguments in the utility function.
Possible changes in income, prices or attributes may change the choice that maximizes
utility and hence aect the values of the compensating variation (CV) and equivalent vari-
ation (EV). While his study concerns shing,2 other examples concern housing 3 or wealth
accumulation.4
Previous literature on calculating welfare loss of labor taxation with piecewise bud-
get constraints is based on analytical solutions. Examples include Hausman (1983) and
Blomquist (1983). In order to allow for this analytical solution in his study of the change
from one piecewise-linear budget constraint to another, Hausman assumes that each per-
son's new optimal choice is on a segment of the new budget constraint. Blomquist allows for
kinks in the existing tax system, but calculates the welfare gains of moving to a proportional
tax system (with no kinks). By using a simulation approach, we can allow for changes to
or from a kink.
The framework we adopt here is pioneered by various studies of Hausman in the 1980's
2In McFadden's example, evaluating environmental damages at various shing sites, the attributes include
the quality and quantity of sh at each site. The CV or EV are those that equalize the maximum utilities
before and after some change in shing quality.
3 In a study of housing and taxes, Berkovec and Fullerton (1992) use a simulation approach to calculate
welfare loss. They employ eight mutually exclusive regimes, with discrete choices about whether to hold
owner housing, rental housing, and corporate equity. For each household, they compare the utility levels
in each regime before the tax change, and again after the tax change. Within each regime, they consider
what tax bracket the person would face. Since they study housing choice, however, they ignore the choice
of working hours. The implicit assumption is that hours do not change in response to a change in tax rate.
4Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) show that the often-assumed monotonic relationship between wealth
and consumption may not be valid anymore due to piecewise-linear budget constraints. Also, the breakdown
of this monotonic relationship may have important eects on wealth accumulation and life-cycle behavior.
2(Hausman, 1981b, 1983, 1985). Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) discuss several attractive
features of this framework: it explicitly recognizes the institutional features of the tax
system, and it readily incorporates the xed cost of holding a job. However, some concerns
on how to estimate labor supply in this framework have also emerged. The most notable
concern is of Heckman (1983), that the budget set for each individual often cannot be
accurately determined and that a special type of errors-in-variable bias results.5 Yet a recent
paper by Gan and Stahl (2002) shows that the Heckman concern can indeed be addressed in
the Hausman framework by introducing measurement error in non-labor income, because it
creates a random budget set. Such a labor supply equation can be estimated in a framework
of piecewise-linear budget constraints without suering from the Heckman concern.
This paper does not provide any assistance in estimating labor supply functions. Rather,
the point is to employ the stochastic specications of such models along with their parameter
estimates when calculating welfare eects of tax changes. It is to be consistent with those
labor supply models that we suggest a Monte Carlo method. These models often have
multiple random errors, and they have no closed-form solution for welfare cost. Our method
yields strikingly dierent results compared to use of point estimates in a simple welfare cost
formula. Then, once the Monte Carlo method is employed, several other complications can
easily be incorporated as well.
In particular, this paper makes several contributions relative to existing welfare cost
calculations. First, we calculate welfare cost using labor supply estimates that account
for the Heckman concern. Second, earlier analytical approaches had to assume that each
person's new indierence curve is tangent to a line segment on the new budget, while our
approach allows movement to or from a kink point. Third, we account for the fact that the
EV or CV itself is a transfer that may also aect the person's choice. Fourth, our simulation
5Also, MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990) argue that the likelihood setup in Hausman's framework
may create articial constraints on the parameter values. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) suggest that the
Triest (1990) dual random error model is not subject to this problem. In fact, however, Hausman's random
coecient model is not subject this problem since the Triest model is a special case of Hausman's model.
See Gan and Stahl (2002) for a detailed discussion on this point.
3method is easy to implement and to calculate, with no additional diculty for a non-convex
budget set. Finally, earlier analytical approaches could not employ the entire estimated
distributions of multiple error terms. For example, Hausman (1983) allows for measurement
error and for heterogeneity in one of the preference parameters. To get a probability-
weighted choice of hours, one needs to integrate over both distributions. To simplify, one
might use just the mean of each distribution. Later we call this the simple \Harberger"
method (Harberger, 1964), because the person's choice is only one point. Instead, Hausman
uses an approximation, evaluating the distribution at the means of intervals. Here, we
employ the entire estimated distributions of both error terms. For each individual in the
data set, our Monte Carlo simulation takes a large number of random drawings from the
two estimated distributions. For each drawing, it calculates the chosen segment or kink,
and the resulting welfare cost. We then have a probability distribution of the welfare cost.
Because welfare cost increases with the square of the tax rate, the expected welfare cost
exceeds the welfare cost at the expected point. Compared to the simple Harberger method,
this procedure might be important, especially if the errors are large and the tax system is
steeply graduated.6
Indeed, we nd larger welfare eects in each of our three illustrations. In one calculation,
Harberger's welfare cost is 26% of tax revenue, Hausman nds 58%, and we nd 75%. For
the rate reduction of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Harberger's gain is 6% of tax revenue,
and ours is 35%. In a nal example where the point estimate of the compensated labor
supply elasticity is near zero, the Harberger-type welfare cost is near zero but ours is not:
the elasticity is estimated with error, and the possibility of a positive elasticity implies
positive expected welfare cost.
In Section 2, we dene and provide a framework to estimate the CV and EV under
budget constraints that are piecewise linear. These budget constraints are discussed in
6Suppose, for example, that the mean of the distribution places the person in the 20% tax bracket but
that the person actually has a 40% probability of being in the 30% bracket. The simple welfare cost is
some constant times .2 squared (which is .04), while the true welfare cost involves the same constant times
[(.6)(.2)(.2) + (.4)(.3)(.3)], which is .06. In this simple example, the welfare cost measure is raised by 50%.
4Section 2.1, while the issues related to CV and EV under piecewise budget constraints are
in Section 2.2. Then Section 3 provides a framework to calculate welfare loss using the
simulation method. Section 4 oers three empirical examples to compare the values of
welfare loss derived from alternative methods. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 A Basic Framework
In this study, we consider a static partial equilibrium labor supply model. The before-tax
wage is constant, with no inter-temporal optimization of labor supply. All of the following
variables are individual-specic, but we suppress the index for notational convenience.
We begin with a typical labor supply model of utility maximization with respect to
choices about leisure and other consumption goods x. The hours of work are dened to be
h,s o−h is leisure. With no taxes, the person's non-labor income is y, and the real wage is
w. The indirect utility v(w;y) is the maximum value of the direct utility u(x;h)t h a tc a n
be obtained when facing the budget constraint:
v(w;y)=m a x x;h u(x;h)
s:t:x − wh = y
(1)
where the price of x is normalized to 1, and the cost of leisure is the wage rate w.
2.1 Budget segments and tax revenues
Graduated tax rates and income transfers imply dierent combinations of real wage
rates and incomes in Equation (1). Let a tax bracket be represented by ftj;Yj−1;Y jg,w h e r e
tj is the marginal tax rate for a person whose before-tax income lies within the interval
[Yj−1;Y j]. Information about ftj;Yj−1;Y jg can often be found from tax tables. Note that
the relevant budget set is based on after-tax income. Let the end points of the segment in a
budget set that corresponds to bracket fYj−1;Y jg be fya
j−1;ya
jg,w h e r eya refers to after-tax
income. A complete characterization of budget segments requires information on working
hours that correspond to the set [ya
j−1;ya
j], and we denote these hours as as [Hj−1;H j]. To
5calculate the location of each budget segment, we start with the rst budget segment and
proceed through all budget segments. Besides the before-tax wage rate w, another critical
piece of information necessary is Y n, the non-labor income this person may have. Let yn
be after-tax non-labor income, where the tax is calculated as if the person had no labor
income. Then labor income pushes the person into successively higher tax brackets. We
summarize information on budget segments in Table 1.
One interesting observation from Table 1 is that non-labor income aects the location
of the budget segments for each individual, since the end points of a budget segment are
functions of Y n or yn:
Hj =( Yj − Y n)=w
ya
j = yn +
Pj
k=2(1 − tk)(Yk − Yk−1)
(2)
A change in non-labor income Y n will lead to a change of the whole budget set. If Y n is
measured with error, the whole budget set will be measured with error. This point is used
by Gan and Stahl (2002) as a way to resolve the critique that Heckman (1983) raises with
respect to the Hausman labor supply estimates.
It is well known in the literature that a person's optimal hours may be at a kink point
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The conditions determining the values of Sj and Kj require knowledge of the labor
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(4)
6where wj  w(1−tj)a n dw h e r es includes zγ (the eect of other socio-demographic variables
z) and the statistical error. In this equation, yv
j is virtual income, dened as the intercept
of the line that extends budget segment j to the zero-hours axis. Given that labor supply
function, the conditions for Sj =1o rKj =1a r e :
Sj =1 i f Hj−1 < w j + yv
j + s<H j
Kj =1 i f wj+1 + yv
j+1 + s  Hj  wj + yv
j + s
(5)
If a budget set is globally convex, the highest indierence curve must either touch a single
kink point or be tangent to a single segment. Only one of Sj or Kj will be 1. However,
often a budget set is not convex due to the xed cost of working or some income transfer
program (such as AFDC or TANF).7 A possibility then arises that more than one of the
Sj and/or Kj is 1. In this case, we must compare the utility levels for for all Sj =1a n d
Kj = 1 and pick the segment or kink point that yields the highest utility level.
Another key variable in the calculation of welfare cost is the tax revenue from this
person, which can be obtained based on the information in Table 1. Let working hours be
h 2 [Hj−1;H j) as in the table. Then the tax revenue R for this individual is:
R = Rn +
j−1 X
k=1
(Hk − Hk−1)wtk +( h − Hj−1)wtj
= Rj−1 +( h − Hj−1)wtj (6)
where Rn is the tax revenue from non-labor income, and Rj−1 is dened as the tax revenue
if the working hours were h = Hj−1 (which may be obtained from the tax table and Table
1 when the wage rate w is given).
2.2 CV and EV under piecewise budget constraints
The welfare cost of the tax may be based on either the compensating variation (CV)
or the equivalent variation (EV). In a simple proportional tax system, consider the case
7Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was replaced in 1996 by Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF).
7where a change in tax moves the pair of after-tax wage and virtual income from (w0;y0)t o
(w0;y0). The CV and EV may be formally dened as:
u0 = v(w0;y0)=v(w0;y0 + CV)
v(w0;y0 − EV)=v(w0;y0)=u0
(7)
Calculating welfare cost in the framework of piecewise-linear budget constraints is sim-
ilar to the problem of calculating willingness-to-pay in a discrete choice model. After a tax
change, when a utility-maximizing individual chooses new working hours on a budget seg-
ment that provides the highest utility, the chosen segment or kink point has likely changed.
We then compare the dierence between the old and new utility levels and nd a CV or
EV value to equalize them. This basic idea is in McFadden (1999), but in our case the CV
or EV is a transfer that may itself aect the person's choice of kink point or segment.
At any kink point where Kj = 1, we use the direct utility function u(x;h), where x = ya
j,
and h = Hj. A person whose optimal hours are zero or negative does not participate in the




Suppose k0 and k0 are the total numbers of segments before and after the tax change.
For a convex budget set, since only one of the Sjsa n dKjs is 1, we can nd the utility levels






























j. Under the new tax regime, a person may
switch to a dierent kink point or segment.
When the budget set is not convex, we must consider the possibility that more than one
of the Sjs and/or Kjs is one (while other segments and kinks are not relevant). Dene
vj  v(wj;yv
j)Sj +( 1− Sj)m
uj  u(ya
j;H j)Kj +( 1− Kj)m
(9)
where m is a large negative number used to represent a ﬂoor under all possible utility
evaluations: m<minjfv(wj;yv
j);u(ya
j;H j)g: The utility levels before and after a change in
8tax can be written as
u0 =m a x jfv0
j;u 0
j;j =1 ;;k0g




where vj and uj are dened in (9).8
Additional complications arise because a lump-sum transfer of CV or EV may change
a person's entire budget set. The new budget set is still piecewise linear, in a way that
corresponds to tax rules, but the extra transfer means that the person can buy more leisure
(as well as other goods). For the end point of budget segment j, Hj does not change, but ya
j
and virtual income yv
j do change { by the amount of lump sum transfer. As a consequence,
the optimal working hours change. Therefore, it is entirely possible that a person moves












j +( 1− K00
j )m
(11)
In (11), the values of S00
j and K00
j are functions of the unknown EV, and m is the same as in
(9). A correct measure of EV must take this complication into account, as the solution to:




j;j =0 ;;k0g (12)
where u0 is dened in Equation (10). Because Sj and Kj depend on the unknown EV,a
solution to (12) must be obtained iteratively. A similar calculation can be undertaken for
CV.
In order to compare these procedures to those suggested in Hausman (1983), we rst
rewrite Hausman's methods in our notation. In particular, consider the expenditure func-
tion, Equation (2.4) in Hausman (1983). The calculation of EV based on such an expendi-
ture function depends on the condition that a person must fall on a particular segment. In
8The purpose of introducing m is to compare utility levels vj and uj only at the relevant segments and
kinks. Equations (9) assign this large negative number m to the segments and kinks that are not relevant.




j ); j =1 ;;k0g;
then v(wj0;yv
j0 − EV)=u0  maxjfv(w0
j;yv
j
0); j =1 ;;k0g
(13)
Equation (13) can be compared to (11)-(12), revealing two dierences: rst, (13) does
not consider a kink point, and second, it does not consider the case that a transfer of EV may
further change the chosen segment. Also, Hausman (1983) mentions that calculation of (13)
by integration over the error terms' distributions is numerically dicult when the budget set
is non-convex. Therefore, he uses various simplications to calculate a good approximate
solution. Because we use Monte Carlo simulations, however, these simplications are no
longer necessary. Finally, note that the simulation method based on (11)-(12) is not aected
by whether the budget set is convex or non-convex.
3 Welfare Loss Based on Stochastic Simulations
In this section, we introduce a stochastic specication into the model of the previous
section, and we provide a simulation-based method to calculate expected welfare loss for
each individual.
3.1 Specifying the utility function
Calculations based on Equation (10) require complete knowledge of a person's direct and
indirect utility functions. Two approaches have been proposed in the literature. In the rst
approach, one may start with an assumed utility specication and then solve for demand
functions including leisure demand (labor supply). For example, Dickens and Lundberg
(1993) use a CES-type of utility function. After estimating the corresponding demand
function, they can use the parameters to calculate welfare loss. In the second approach,
introduced in Hausman (1981a), one starts with and estimates a specication of the demand
function, such as a linear specication, and \recovers" the utility function for that demand




one can solve a dierential equation to get v(w;y). Although Slesnick (1998) points out
that closed-form solutions to Equation (14) can only be obtained for a limited class of
demand functions, Hausman and Newey (1995) show that a relatively simple algorithm can
numerically solve the dierential equation. Thus, more general functional forms could be
used for labor supply.
Nevertheless, we adopt the second approach and use labor supply functions that yield
closed-form solutions. In particular, we consider a linear labor supply function as in (4).















When a person is at a kink point, the indierence curve is not tangent to the budget
set, so the utility level can only be obtained from the direct utility function. At kink point
j, the direct utility function corresponding to the labor supply function in (4) is:
u(ya
j;H j)=e x p
 
ya







3.2 A stochastic specication and simulation procedures
So far, we have discussed how to obtain utility functions from empirically estimated labor
supply functions, but these functions are estimated with stochastic error. Part of this error
may represent the deviation between actual hours and desired hours (which econometricians
do not observe). Another part may be a deliberate eort by the econometrician to represent
the heterogeneity of preferences or to represent specication errors. A typical example is
in a random coecient model where a parameter of the model is assumed to be randomly
distributed, and where the task of the estimation is to obtain the parameters of that random
distribution.
When the stochastic errors enter into an objective function linearly, they tend to cancel
out. In that case, a non-stochastic calculation might be sucient. In our case, however,
11the welfare loss is a non-linear function of the stochastic errors. Comparing a stochastically
specied model and a non-stochastic one, the welfare loss calculation may be signicantly
dierent. We show this dierence below.
Researchers may obtain information from a stochastic model that would be dicult or
impossible to obtain from a non-stochastic model. For example, if one is interested in the
probability of switching segments, or of switching from participating in the labor force to
non-participation, one can acquire this information rather easily in a stochastically-specied
model. That information may be very hard to obtain from a non-stochastic model.
In this section, we consider a stochastic specication based on empirically estimated
labor supply equations. The stochastic errors in dierent specications of labor supply
have dierent forms. In Hausman (1981b), for example, the labor supply equation is:
h = wj +(  + )yv
j + zγ +  (17)
where  is the mean value of , the coecient on virtual income yv
j. Equation (17) has two
errors:  represents heterogeneity of preferences, and  is the error in measuring working
hours. Another example is in Triest (1990), where the labor supply equation is:
h = wj + yv
j + zγ +  +  (18)
In this equation,  is an optimization error. It is not observed by the econometrician
but only observed by the individual to determine her segment or kink point. Again,  serves
as measurement error for working hours. At a kink point in this model, we only have error
, but both  and  are present when a person is on a line segment.
For both (17) and (18), the indirect and direct utility functions are given in (15) and
(16), respectively. Often, when labor supply equations are estimated, the density forms
of  and  are assumed, and the parameters of the density functions are estimated. Our
simulation procedure is based on random draws of  and  from the estimated densities.
We now describe the basic procedure of this simulation method.
We start with the choice of estimated labor supply equation (17) or (18), and then
for each worker we take I =1 ;000 draws of the error term   (;). The draws may
12come from a \known" parametric distribution specied and estimated for the labor supply
function. Alternatively, it may come from the empirical distribution of the residuals of the
labor supply function.9





Then from (9) and (10), we nd the optimal segment or kink point in each of the two tax
regimes, given i. This procedure applies whether the budget set is convex or non-convex.
Let j0
i and j0
i be the optimal choice of segment or kink in the two tax regimes, given
the ith draw of ,a n dl e tu0
i be the optimal utility in the old tax regime given i.W ec a n
obtain the EVi,g i v e ni,a n du0
i, using (11) and (12). Note that the chosen segment or kink
point reﬂects the transfer of EVi. Solving (12) requires numerical iteration.
For any individual worker, we know the j0
i and j0
i for the it hd r a w ,s oi ti se a s yt oo b t a i n
the tax revenues in the two tax regimes R0
i and R0
i (and Ri  R0
i −R0
i). One denition of
deadweight loss (DWL) for this person, just for the ith drawing from the whole distribution
of  is:10
DWLi −(EVi − Ri): (19)
Naturally, the mean of all these DWLi can be made arbitrarily close to the expectation














The mean square error of the simulation is proportional to 1/I (see Geweke and Keane,
2001). One may also calculate the probability of moving from segment j0 to segment j0.








9In principle, using this kind of simulation method, one could also introduce errors on parameters to
account for standard errors of parameter estimates.
10See Mohring (1971) and Auerbach (1985). Since EV < 0 for a gain, we take the negative of (EV −R)
in order to show a positive number for a welfare gain from removing the tax (loss from having the tax).
13or the probability of moving from segment j0 to kink j0:








In addition, we can calculate the change of working hours. If labor supply is estimated
using (18), for example, and if j0
i and j0
i are chosen segments, for each random draw i,t h e n
working hours can be calculated as:
h0
i =^ wj0
i + ^ yv
j0
i + z^ γ + i + i
h0
i =^ wj0
i + ^ yv
j0
i + z^ γ + i + i
The dierence between h0
i and h0
i is the change in labor supply, hi. The average from














All the estimated factors are calculated conditional on the wage rate w, virtual income
yv, and other socio-demographic variables z. We can then integrate over these factors to get
the population average. In practice, we just repeat the previous process for each successive
individual in the sample and take the average of all individuals (applying sample weights,
if available).
4E x a m p l e s
This section provides three illustrations of the procedures just described.
Example 1: The welfare loss of taxation for a married woman.
As in Hausman (1981b), we consider a married woman whose wage rate is $4.15 an
hour, and whose husband is earning a xed $10,000 (both in 1975 dollars). She works full
time (1,925 hours per year) and les a joint return. The tax regime she faces is shown
in Table 2, the federal tax brackets of 1975 (the sample year for Hausman, 1981b). The
\new tax" regime is no tax at all. We choose this example for several reasons: First, this
14example is considered in Hausman (1981b), where he estimates labor supply using data
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and applies the estimates to calculate
welfare loss. Second, the standard deduction for a married couple ling a joint return in
1975 creates a non-convex budget set.11 Third, this example has only one person, so it
can be used to illustrate how the stochastic specication yields various possibilities for the
chosen segment or kink point. It is also easy to compare the results with a traditional
welfare cost calculation such as the Harberger triangle.
The estimated hours equation is given by
h = wj + (yv
j − FC)+zγ +  (21)
where h is in thousands of hours, yv
j is in thousands of dollars, wj is in dollars per hour, and
FC is the xed cost of working (1.26 thousand dollars per year). Hausman estimates that
^  =0 :4608, with a standard error :106, and  is a random coecient representing variations
in taste, with a truncated normal distribution (i.e.,  = k where k  N(2:0216; 0:52622)
and k < 0). The mean of this truncated normal is E()=−:123. Also,   N(0; 0:28012).
Then we obtain zγ =0 :2595, from the equation
zγ = h − ^ wj + E()(yv
j − ^ FC) (22)
where h =1 :925 thousand hours, and j is the chosen segment. At the means of the
parameters and of the error distribution, the marginal tax rate for this woman is 28%.
The random draws represent both the preference heterogeneity and measurement errors
of working hours among all those married women who have exactly the same observed set
of characteristics as this woman (working full time at 1,925 hours per year, ling joint tax
returns, having non-labor income of $10,000, and earning $4.15 per hour). Therefore, our
simulation results can be said to estimate welfare eects for a subset of the population that
has the observed characteristics of the woman in this example.
11In 1975, for income below $11,800, the standard deduction for a married couple ling a joint return was
$1,900. Then, when total income is between $11,800 and $16,250, the true marginal tax rate falls because
the standard deduction is $1,900 plus 16% of the income that exceeds $11,800.
15Table 3 rst shows that the DWL estimate is $471 per year for this person using a
simple Harberger triangle approximation.12 Our stochastic specication not only yields an
expected DWL that is substantially larger ($1,401), but it also provides an estimate of
the standard error for DWL ($716). The welfare loss based on the Harberger triangle is
about 26.0% of tax revenue for this woman, but the expected DWL over expected revenue
is 75.5%. The estimate by Hausman is in between, at 58.1% of tax revenue. All of these
numbers are large because of the large compensated elasticity from the Hausman estimates.
In the stochastic specication, this person has probabilities of being on dierent segments
or kink points, as shown in Table 4. The probability that this working woman chooses the
segment with the 28% tax rate (segment 5) is 47.2%. The sum of the probabilities of choosing
kink points is 13.1%. Generally speaking, segments or kink points closer to segment 5 have
higher probabilities, with two exceptions. First, kink points 1 and 2 have zero probabilities,
since the budget set is non-convex around these two kink points. Second, the probability of
being at kink point 0 (not working) is positive (.032) because of the xed cost of working
in this model. Not working yields highest utility for some random draws where the optimal
working hours are relatively small. In the new tax regime with no tax at all, the person has
96% probability of working, and 4% chance of not working.
The simple Harberger calculation is possible when the individual switches from an ob-
served segment of a non-linear budget constraint to a known segment after the tax change
(such as the zero tax rate in the example above). With a switch from one non-linear tax
system to another, however, the simulation of the new tax regime may place the individ-
ual on a number of possible segments or kinks. Thus, no direct Harberger calculation is
feasible for our next two examples, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Bush tax cut of
2001. Instead, for comparison, we use the results of our simulations to calculate the income-
weighted average of marginal tax rates before and after reform, and use those to calculate
a Harberger-type DWL before and after reform { a calculation that would not be possible
12For this purpose, we use Equation (4) in Browning (1987) for DWL as a function of the compensated
labor supply elasticity, the xed gross wage rate, labor hours, and the marginal tax rate.
16without our model.
Example 2: The Tax Reform Act of 1986 for married women.
The parameter estimates used in this example are from Triest (1990), and they are
applied to a cross-section of married women extracted from the 1983 PSID.13 Table 5 lists
the tax rates and income brackets for both tax regimes. We assume all individuals take the
standard deduction and le jointly.14
The basic labor supply function in Triest (1990) appears above as Equation (18). In our
data set, we observe each woman's working hours and wage rate in 1983. The non-labor
income is calculated from the husband's income and other family income. We can therefore
derive the budget constraint for each woman, and determine her chosen segment or kink
point. Triest assumes no xed cost of working. If the chosen segment is j,w i t ho b s e r v e d
net wage wj and virtual income yv
j, then we can use Triest's parameter estimates ^  = :235
and ^  = −:022 to calculate for each observation:
zγ = h − ^ wj − ^ yv
j
The random errors i and i are distributed as   N(0;0:672)a n d  N(0;0:772).
Since the mean of the observed workings hours is 1.074 thousand hours in a year, the
standard deviations of the random errors  (0.67 thousand hours) and  (0.77 thousand
hours) represent substantial variations in working hours.
For each individual, we take 1,000 random draws from the joint distribution of (;).15
13We extract data from the 1983 PSID following the procedures described in Triest (1990), but some
dierences appear between our data and the Triest data. Our data set has 1,136 observations, while Triest
has only 978 observations, but the summary statistics for our data and the Triest data are very close. One
possible explanation is that the new version of the PSID has fewer missing values.
14We model only the reduced rates of the 1986 Act, not the redenition of taxable income to broaden the
tax base, so we probably overestimate tax rate reduction for women whose loss of tax deductions push them
back into higher brackets.
15The errors are large enough, however, that a few extreme drawings yield implausible results. To avoid
unreasonably large EV, we constrain the absolute value of EV to be smaller than before-tax total family
income. The EV hits this constraint for .43% of all individuals at all random draws.
17We rst calculate EV, working hours, and taxes for each random draw, and then we average
over 1,000 random draws to get this individual's EV, working hours and taxes. Each random
draw can be considered to represent a dierent person with the same observed variables
as the current individual. Dierent random draws yield dierent initial working hours,
although averaging over 1,000 random draws yields working hours very close to the observed
working hours of the individual. Together, the 1,000 random draws represent a subset of
population that shares the same observed variables as this individual. By averaging over all
random draws, we get the average welfare eect for that subset of the population. Since we
have a representative sample of married women, averaging over all 1,136 individuals yields
estimates for the population of married women.16
Table 6 shows the change in tax revenue, the change in working hours, the equivalent
variation, and the net welfare gain from this tax reform for the population represented by
our sample. Interestingly, even though the tax reform generally reduces tax rates, it slightly
reduces average working hours. This \backward bending" labor supply behavior indicates
that the income eect dominates. The income-weighted average of marginal tax rates is
reduced from 33.9% to 28.7%.17 Tax revenue in the new regime falls by 37.7%. Since
marginal tax rates are reduced more for initial brackets, the percentage fall is larger for tax
revenue than for the average of all marginal tax rates.
Since EV on average is negative, the utility level in the new tax regime is higher. Because
of the large standard deviations of the random errors (;), the EV in Table 6 also has a
large standard deviation. The expected net welfare eect is $1,790 per family, or 34.9% of
old tax revenue.
If Triest's estimates are evaluated at the mean wage and mean marginal tax rate of
his sample, the compensated labor supply elasticity is .686 for a full time worker.18 This
16We did not consider the fact that the PSID oversamples minorities.
17This summary statistic is used only in the simple Harberger formula, and it reﬂects the fact that a
higher income person contributes more to tax revenue (and aggregate DWL) than a lower income person.
18To compare the Triest and Hausman estimates, we can apply the Triest estimates to the woman in the
rst example above. Her compensated elasticity would then be only .430 instead of 1.084.
18elasticity could be used in a simple Harberger formula to calculate DWL of the old tax,
compared to no tax system. When the new marginal tax rate is unknown, however, the
new DWL is not so simple. Our method is useful to predict the new marginal tax rate of
each person. When we employ the predicted rates in the Harberger formula, before and
after reform, Table 6 shows that the change in DWL is only 5.7% of old tax revenue.
Example 3: The tax change of 2001 for married women.
In this example, we apply the parameter estimates of Gan and Stahl (2002) to the
Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001 (the Bush tax cut). Their model
assumes measurement error in non-labor income Y n,
Y n = Y n −  (23)
where Y n is observed non-labor income, and Y n is the true non-labor income (known to the
individual herself but not to the econometrician). The measurement error,   N(0;2
), in
non-labor income produces a random budget set: the end points of each segment are random
variables. Such a model is not subject to the Heckman critique. In fact, it conforms to the
insights in Heckman (1983). Gan and Stahl show that such a model yields very dierent
parameter estimates and performs better statistically. Given the error in Y n, which aects
yv
j, the estimated labor supply equation is:
h = wj + yv
j + zγ +  (24)
Here, we use the same data set as in Gan and Stahl (2002): married women in the
Current Population Survey (CPS) of March 2001 between the ages of 25 and 55. This
data set has 16,829 observations. The parameter estimates and summary statistics are
listed in Table 7. One interesting aspect of the parameter estimates is the large standard
deviation of the measurement error in nonlabor income ( =1 :33, where income is in
thousands of dollars). Another interesting aspect is that the income elasticity is very small
(the compensated wage elasticity and the uncompensated wage elasticity are both .012).19
19We recognize that these low elasticity estimates may be controversial. The purpose here is not to endorse
19Their estimates are used here to evaluate the eect of the Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, or simply the \Bush tax cut." We consider only the
changes in marginal tax rates, and since the changes are phased in, we use only the rates
after 2006 when all changes are fully implemented. Table 8 compares the regimes before
and after the Bush tax cut. Again, we assume that all of these married women take the
standard deduction and le jointly.
We take 50 random draws of the error in equation (24),   N(0;0:652), where hours
are in thousands, and for each , we take 50 random draws of the error in Equation (23),
  N(0;1:332). Note that each dierent  yields a dierent budget constraint.
Averaging the 16,829 individuals, Table 9 shows the change in tax revenue, the change
in working hours, the equivalent variation, and the welfare gain from this tax reform. The
net result is almost no change in expected working hours. The tax revenue is lowered by
an average of $843 per person, and the expected welfare gain is $357 per person. This
number has a large error, but the point estimate is 3.5% of revenue in the old tax regime.
In contrast, using the point estimate of the compensated labor supply elasticity (.012) yields
a change in Harberger DWL that is $.40, or zero percent of old tax revenue.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The calculation of welfare loss suggested in this paper depends on estimates of labor supply.
An ongoing debate concerns how to estimate the labor supply function under piecewise-
linear budget constraints, but recent estimates are able to address the Heckman concern
within Hausman's framework. The rst contribution of this paper, relative to existing
literature, is to calculate the welfare cost of labor taxes using labor supply estimates that
address this concern. Second, we allow each individual to move from any kink or linear
segment of the original budget constraint to any kink or linear segment of the new budget
their method, or even to repeat discussion of it, but just to show that the simulation method described here
is applicable to any estimated model. This example also is useful to show that the expected welfare eect
may still be positive even when the point estimate of the labor supply elasticity is near zero.
20constraint. Third, we account for the fact that the equivalent variation is a transfer that
itself would change the choice of each individual. Fourth, the method we propose is relatively
easy to implement and to calculate. Finally, our method uses Monte Carlo simulation in
order to employ the entire estimated distribution of each error term. Thus, we need not
assume that the person chooses one particular point, which would ignore the fact that labor
supply is estimated with error.
Using this new method, we calculate the welfare eect of three illustrative labor tax
changes. First, we employ the example of Hausman (1981b) with one married woman who
works full time. We show that the welfare eect of eliminating the tax system in this
example using the stochastic evaluation is signicantly larger than when using a simple
Harberger triangle approximation. Second, we employ Triest's (1990) estimates to consider
1,136 married women in the 1983 PSID data. In this case, we show that the mean welfare
gain from the tax rate reduction of Tax Reform Act of 1986 is 34.9% of the original tax
revenue. In the third case, we apply the estimates from Gan and Stahl (2002) to a recent
data set from the CPS (March, 2001) to investigate the welfare gains of the Bush tax cut of
2001. We nd almost no change in working hours for these married women. Even though
the point estimate of the labor supply elasticity is near zero, the use of all error distributions
yields an expected welfare gain that is 3.5% of the old tax revenue.
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23Table 1: Summary of budget segments
Budget Budget
segment 1 segment j>1
Function for after-tax
income ya ya = yn + w(1 − t1)hy a = ya
j−1 + w(1 − tj)(h − Hj−1)
Kink points for ya
0 = yn ya
j = ya
j−1 + w(1 − tj)(Hj − Hj−1)
income ya = yn +
Pj
k=2(1 − tk)(Yk − Yk−1)
Kink points for H0 =0 Hj =( Yj − Y n)=w
working hours hH 1 =( Y1 − Y n)=w
Virtual income yv yv
1 = yn yv
j = ya
j−1 − w(1 − tj)Hj−1
= Y n(2 − t1 − tj) − Yj(1 − tj)
+
Pj
k=1(1 − tk)(Yk − Yk−1)
We dene t1 as the rst tax rate applied to labor income of this person (after taxation of
non-labor income). Using the person's non-labor income, tj and Yj are also individual-specic,
but can be found from the tax table.
24Table 2: Tax schedule for example 1
(married woman ling a joint 1975 tax return)
Income Rates
0 { $1,900 .0
$1,900 { $2,900 .14
$2,900 { $5,900 .16
$5,900 { $9,900 .19
$9,900 { $11,800 .22
$11,800 { $13,900 .185
$13,900 { $16,250 .21
$16,250 { $17,900 .25
$17,900 { $21,900 .28
$21,900 { $25,900 .32
$25,900 { $29,900 .36
$29,900 { $33,900 .39
$33,900 { $37,900 .42
$37,900 { $41,900 .45
$41,900 { $45,900 .48
$45,900 + .50
25Table 3: Welfare eect in example 1 with the 1975 tax system
before-tax wage = 4.15; before-tax non-labor income = $10,000
Deterministic evaluation
Working hours 1,925




DWL as % of tax revenue 26.0%
Means using stochastic evaluationa
Old working hours (with 1975 taxes) 2,019
(753)
New working hours (with no taxes) 2,386
(943)






E(DWL) as % of tax revenue, E(R0) 75.5%
a. Standard errors are in parentheses.
b. EV < 0 means a gain from removal of the tax.
c. The DWL is −(EV − R).
26Table 4: The probability that the working woman in example 1
is on each initial budget segment or kink
Segments Kink points
Marginal
Number tax rate Probabilities Probabilities
0 .032
1. 2 2 a .020 .0
2 .185 .042 .0
3 .21 .111 .021
4 .25 .128 .039
5. 2 8 b .472 .039
6 .32 .086 .0
a. This woman has $10,000 of non-labor income, so the rst tax rate
applied to any of her labor income is 22% (even though that
is the fth bracket of the 1975 tax system shown in Table 2).
b. Using only the mean of the distribution, this woman would be
on segment 5 in the old tax regime.
27Table 5: Tax schedules for example 2, the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(married women ling joint 1983 tax returns)
Old tax regime New tax regime
Income Rates Income Rates
0 { $3,400 0 0 { $3,000 .11
$3,400 { $5,500 .11 $3,000 { $28,000 .15
$5,500 { $7,600 .13 $28,000 { $45,000 .28
$7,600 { $11,900 .15 $45,000 { $90,000 .35
$11,900{ $16,000 .17 $90,000 { .385
$16,000 { $20,200 .19
$20,200 { $24,600 .23
$24,600 { $29,900 .26
$29,900 { $35,200 .30
$35,200 { $45,800 .35
$45,800 { $60,000 .40
$60,000 { $85,600 .44
$85,600 { $109,000 .48
$109,000 + .50
28Table 6: Welfare eect in example 2, the Tax Reform Act of 1986
Old tax New tax Dierence
regime regime
Tax revenue $5,132 $3,196 -$1,936
($5,566)a ($3,693) ($1,915)
Working hours 1,230 1,170 -60
(711) (715) (410)






Welfare eect as a % of old tax revenue 34.9%
% with negative welfare eect 18.6%
Harberger DWLd $874 $581 $293
as % of tax revenue 17.0% 11.3% 5.7%
a. Standard errors are in parentheses.
b. EV < 0 means a gain.
c. The welfare gain is −(EV − R).
d. Evaluated at the mean wage and mean marginal tax rate for a full time worker.
29Table 7: Estimation results and summary statistics from the CPS (March, 2001)a
Coecient Summary
estimates statistics




Wage (in $ per hour) .00012 16.16
(0.000034) (25.5)
Non-labor income (in $1000 per year) -0.00176 58.59
(.00013) (59.3)
# kids ages 0-5 -.214 .369
(.008) (.675)
# kids ages 6-18 -.088 .880
(.0046) (1.06)
Age minus 40 -.012 .36
(.0036) (2.65)
Unemployment rate (%) -.011 4.01
(.0037) (1.61)
Education (in years) .034 10.14
(.0020) (3.14)
# of observations 16,829
% labor participation 75.2%
Std dev of measurement error ()1 . 3 3
(.12)
Std dev of optimization error (). 6 5
(.0034)
Elasticities (evaluated at means)
Uncompensated .012
Compensated .012
Source: Gan and Stahl (2002).
a. Married women between ages 25 and 55.
b. Standard errors are in parentheses.
30Table 8: Tax schedules for example 3, the Bush tax cuts of 2001
(married women ling joint 2001 tax returns)
Old tax regime New tax regimea
Income Rates Income Rates
0 { $7,600 0 0 { $7,600 0
$7,601 { $51,450 .15 $7,601 { $13,600 .10
$51,451 { $113,550 .28 $13,601 { $51,450 .15
$113,551 { $169,050 .31 $51,451 { $113,550 .25
$169,051{ $295,950 .36 $113,551 {$169,050 .28
$295,951 + .396 $169,051 {$295,950 .33
$295,951 + .35
a. The new tax regime is the Bush tax cut, the Economic Growth
and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001.
31Table 9: Welfare eect in example 3, the 2001 Bush tax cuts
Old tax New tax Dierence
regime regime
Tax revenue $10,061 $9,218 -$843
($16,610)a ($15,050) ($1,568)
Working hours 1,390 1,381 -9
(340) (344) (113)






Welfare eect as a % of old tax revenue 3.5%
% with negative welfare eect 31.6%
Harberger DWLd $19.50 $19.10 $.40
as % of old tax revenue .19% .19% 0.0%
a. Standard errors are in parentheses.
b. EV < 0 means a gain.
c. The welfare gain is −(EV − R).
d. Evaluated at mean wage and mean marginal tax rate for a full time worker.
32